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Of What Consequence?: 
Sexual Offender Laws and Federal 
Habeas Relief 
KATHERINE A. MITCHELL* 
New concerns for an old writ. The relatively recent advent of sex 
offender registries has led to consequences in the habeas corpus 
context—and they may be more than collateral. In particular, are 
the restraints imposed on registered sex offenders severe enough to 
constitute custody for habeas jurisdiction? With a recent split 
among the federal circuit courts, this Article attempts to decipher 
which side of the split the Supreme Court will—and should—fall.  
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“If you dare to prey on our children, the law will follow you 
wherever you go—state to state, town to town.” 
President Bill Clinton, 19961 
 
Dating back to the Magna Carta,2 the tides of time have pro-
duced both ebbs and expansions of the Great Writ’s jurisdictional 
reach. Specifically, in the United States, the Supreme Court’s habeas 
jurisprudence has transformed considerably—from the Warren 
Court’s liberalization of habeas procedure3 to the consequent 
pushback from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.4 And with 
 
 1 Ron Fournier, Clinton Signs Law on Sex Offenders, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 
18, 1996, at 12. 
 2 Or, more accurately, to the Unknown Charter, drafted almost a month prior 
to the Magna Carta by a delegation of King John’s discontented barons and 
“which contained an imperfect transcription” of King Henry I’s Coronation Char-
ter. See Stephen Rohde, From Discontented Barons to Predator Drones, L.A. 
REV. BOOKS (June 14, 2015), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/magna-carta-
from-discontented-barons-to-predator-drones/. 
 3 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438–39 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 
372 U.S. 293, 312–13, 317 (1963); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15–19 
(1963) (collectively known as the Habeas Trilogy). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443 (1953), which was decided directly before Chief Justice Warren was 
appointed to the Supreme Court but was nevertheless significant to the series of 
habeas cases that followed. 
 4 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87–91 (1977); Rose v. Lundy, 
455 U.S. 509, 521–22 (1982); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134, 136 (1987). 
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Congress’s passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act (“AEDPA”),5 the limits of habeas relief continue to evolve.6 
Nevertheless, at its core, habeas corpus is largely a jurisdictional is-
sue. The “very essence” of habeas corpus contemplates that the pe-
titioner is in custody;7 therefore, absent custody, a court simply lacks 
habeas jurisdiction.8 
At its historical roots, habeas custody was a non-issue. With its 
Latin name loosely translating to “produce the body,” the writ re-
quired a jailer (or custodian) to “produce a prisoner in a court of 
law” to review the basis of his or her detention.9 A custodian could 
not produce one who was not confined. Due in part to legislative 
creativity, however, newly devised sentencing schemes and post-
conviction requirements have created various quandaries regarding 
how to interpret whether a prisoner is “in custody” for habeas pur-
poses.10 Custody, therefore, is no longer limited to actual physical 
confinement.11 One such recent legislative creation is the enactment 
of various sex offender registration and notification laws, which 
continue to impact individuals convicted of sexual offenses long af-
ter service of their sentences and periods of supervision.12 In fact, 
many of these laws were enacted as post-sentencing measures in an 
attempt to protect and notify the public of sex offenders in their re-
spective communities—specifically envisioning that these offenders 
would no longer be in physical custody when the requirements at-
tach.13 
The Supreme Court has yet to announce whether the conse-
quences of these registration provisions amount to custody required 
 
 5 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996). 
 6 Or devolve, based on your view. See Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of 
Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER (June 21, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights. 
 7 ANDREA D. LYON ET AL., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 93 (2d ed. 2011). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Jonathan Shaw, The War and the Writ: Habeas Corpus and Security in 
an Age of Terrorism, HARV. MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 24–25. 
 10 See LYON ET AL., supra note 7, at 93. 
 11 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963). 
 12 LYON ET AL., supra note 7, at 104. 
 13 See, e.g., Megan’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (permitting states to collect 
and release “relevant information” about registered sex offenders to extent that it 
is “necessary to protect the public”). 
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by habeas; the federal judiciary, however, has been far from silent. 
With the recent advent of a split among the circuits14—and the sheer 
volume of individuals potentially affected by such a decision15—
this Article attempts to decipher which side of the split the Supreme 
Court will—and should—fall. This Article argues that as a matter of 
both common sense and judicial precedent, the restraints imposed 
on registered sex offenders are sufficiently severe to satisfy habeas 
custody. Nevertheless, this Article will also discuss potential—and 
well-founded—concerns that may inhibit the Supreme Court from 
extending habeas custody beyond its current scope. 
I. “IN CUSTODY” JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT & 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
As mentioned, two basic premises underlie habeas corpus: (1) 
that a court is only capable of providing habeas relief to an individ-
ual “in custody,” and (2) this traditional limitation is jurisdictional.16 
Congress codified this common law understanding of the writ, in-
corporating the “in-custody” requirement into the federal habeas 
statutory scheme.17 Specifically, pertinent provisions of Section 
2241(c)—establishing the judiciary’s power to grant the writ—pro-
vide: 
 
 14 See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183–85 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521–23 (6th Cir. 2002); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 
F.3d 707, 717–20 (7th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 335–39 (4th 
Cir. 2012); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2014); 
Piasecki v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161, 177 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 15 See generally How Many Registered Sex Offenders are There in Your 
State?, SAFEHOME.ORG (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.safehome.org/data/regis-
tered-sex-offender-stats/ [hereinafter How Many in Your State?] (estimating 
752,000 registered sex offenders across U.S. as of fall 2019). 
 16 See LYON ET AL., supra note 7, at 93; Case Comment, The Custody Re-
quirement and Territorial Jurisdiction in Federal Habeas Corpus: Word v. North 
Carolina, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 631 (1970) (“The availability of the ‘great writ’ 
has been limited, however, by the traditional requirement that the petitioner be ‘in 
custody’ under the sentence which he desires to challenge.”); see also Williamson, 
151 F.3d at 1182 (“Because the ‘in custody’ requirement is jurisdictional, it is the 
first question we must consider on this appeal.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 17 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254–2255. 
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(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a 
prisoner unless— 
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the au-
thority of the United States or is committed for 
trial before some court thereof; or 
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in 
pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, 
process, judgment or decree of a court or judge 
of the United States; or 
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States . . . .18 
Section 2241’s counterparts for state and federal prisoners—sec-
tions 2254 and 2255, used predominantly by prisoners seeking ha-
beas relief—contain similar “in-custody” requirements.19 
Traditionally, federal courts have narrowly interpreted the “cus-
tody” requirement as current, physical confinement.20 Nevertheless, 
the Court has recognized a markedly more expansive interpretation 
over time, highlighting that the Great Writ “never has been a static, 
 
 18 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1)–(3) (emphases added). 
 19 Section 2255(a) states that 
[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by 
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the 
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was with-
out jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that sentence was 
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise 
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed 
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, section 2254(a) states that 
[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a dis-
trict court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 
a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation 
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). 
 20 See, e.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1885) (denying habeas 
petition brought by Navy officer confined to territorial limits of District of Co-
lumbia because restraint did not involve “actual confinement or the present means 
of enforcing it”). 
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narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand 
purpose—the protection of individuals against erosion of their right 
to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty.”21 Therefore, 
federal habeas review can do more than “reach behind prison walls 
and iron bars.”22 
In 1963, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of “in cus-
tody” to include prisoners placed on parole subject to restrictive con-
ditions that “significantly restrain [their] liberty to do those things 
which in this country free men are entitled to do.”23 The Court 
pointed to specific restrictions underlying its decision: The parolee 
was required to remain in “a particular community, house, and job 
at the sufferance of his parole officer”; obtain permission to drive a 
vehicle; report to a parole officer and “permit the officer to visit his 
home and job at any time”; work regularly; and “live a clean, honest, 
and temperate life.”24 The Court also highlighted that the parolee 
was subject to re-arrest at any time.25 
The Court continued this jurisdictional expansion in Carafas v. 
LaVallee, where the Court examined whether habeas jurisdiction 
was nullified when a petitioner filed for the writ while incarcerated, 
yet was unconditionally released prior to the Court’s issuance of cer-
tiorari.26 In a unanimous opinion, the Court found as a threshold 
matter that the petitioner’s release did not render his cause moot.27 
In so finding, the Court highlighted the derivative social restraints 
of the petitioner’s conviction: 
In consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage 
in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official 
of a labor union for a specified period of time; he 
cannot vote in any election held in New York State; 
he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these “disabil-
ities or burdens [which] may flow from” petitioner’s 
conviction, he has “a substantial stake in the judg-
ment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of 
 
 21 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 242–43. 
 24 Id. at 242. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). 
 27 Id. at 237. 
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the sentence imposed on him.” On account of these 
“collateral consequences,” the case is not moot.28 
Having found the case justiciable, the Court then determined that the 
federal habeas statute does not limit relief to those in physical cus-
tody; thus, it retained jurisdiction.29 And because petitioner “[was] 
suffering, and [would] continue to suffer, serious disabilities,” peti-
tioner’s habeas application was entitled to consideration on the mer-
its.30 
This holding, however, was significantly undercut in Maleng v. 
Cook, where the Court retreated from its liberalization of the habeas 
custody requirement.31 The Court held that the mere “possibility” of 
a future sentence enhancement is insufficient to establish habeas 
custody under a conviction after the sentence imposed has fully ex-
pired.32 The Court clarified that its custody finding in Carafas 
“rested . . . not on the collateral consequences of the conviction, but 
on the fact that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the 
challenged conviction at the time the petition was filed.”33 There-
fore, once a sentence imposed for a conviction has fully expired, 
“the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves 
sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’” for habeas pur-
poses.34 Noting that “almost all States have habitual offender 
 
 28 Id. at 237–38 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Fiswick 
v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946)). 
 29 Id. at 238–39. 
 30 Id. at 239 (quoting Fiswick, 329 U.S. at 222); see also Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40, 50–53 (1968) (decided a few days after Carafas and noting that im-
portant constitutional problems may arise as a result of minor offenses; therefore, 
petitioners should not be foreclosed from the availability of constitutional protec-
tions—despite their expired sentences). 
 31 See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam). 
 32 Id.; cf. Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). In 
Coss, the Court held that a habeas petitioner can satisfy the “in custody” require-
ment of section 2254 where his petition can be construed as asserting a challenge 
to a current sentence as enhanced by an allegedly invalid prior conviction. Id. at 
401–402. The Court nevertheless barred habeas petitioners from using the chal-
lenge of a current conviction to concurrently attack the validity of an earlier con-
viction for which they are no longer in custody, with the sole exception for invalid 
predicate convictions based on Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Id. at 
404. 
 33 Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491–92. 
 34 Id. at 92 (emphasis added). 
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statutes,” the Court refused to extend the custodial requirement to 
situations “where a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint 
from a conviction.”35 
Although, taken together, these holdings are somewhat incon-
gruent, they make clear that constructive custody—that is, custody 
short of physical confinement—may satisfy the habeas statute’s “in-
custody” requirement.36 This is so where a petitioner files while sub-
ject to significant restraints on his or her liberties that are not other-
wise imposed on the general public.37 Nevertheless, the Court is dis-
inclined to find—and has in fact explicitly rejected—collateral con-
sequences alone as sufficient for custody where the petitioner’s sen-
tence has fully expired prior to filing the writ.38 A subtle but signif-
icant relationship exists between Article III mootness and the habeas 
custody requirement: “collateral consequences can preserve habeas 
jurisdiction, once established, against a claim of mootness, but do 
not suffice, in and of themselves, in the absence of initial jurisdic-
tion.”39 Thus, collateral consequences alone may suffice to over-
come a mootness challenge. They are not, however, sufficient to “in-
itiate a habeas petition.”40 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 
It is under this framework that the Supreme Court would decide 
whether the restrictions imposed by sex offender registration and 
notification laws amount to habeas custody. As we will see, such 
restrictions are profuse. 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 See also Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351–52 (1973) (finding habeas 
petitioner—released on his own recognizance after sentencing but prior to incar-
ceration—”in custody” for purposes of section 2254 because he was “subject to 
restraints not shared by the public generally” (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 
U.S. 236, 240 (1963)). 
 37 Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 240. 
 38 See, e.g., Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (“[O]nce the sentence imposed for a 
conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction 
are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes 
of a habeas attack upon it.”). 
 39 Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 147, 157 (2000). 
 40 Id. (quoting LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 49, at 219 
(1981 & Supp. 2000)). 
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A. National Outcry: The Influx of Sex Offender Registration 
Regulations 
The country’s criminal history is rife with so-called “sex crime 
waves,” often produced by widespread media coverage of one or 
more particularly disturbing—and sometimes sensationalized—sex-
ual offenses.41 These high-profile sex crimes, especially those com-
mitted against children, pervade popular, academic, and legislative 
discussion, leading to a paroxysm of both public outrage and conse-
quent legislative response.42 
For example, in 1947—in the midst of one of recent history’s 
purported sex waves—FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover’s article, How 
Safe is Your Daughter?, proclaimed, “The most rapidly increasing 
type of crime is that perpetrated by degenerate sex offend-
ers . . . . [It] is taking its toll at the rate of a criminal assault every 43 
minutes, day and night in the United States.”43 Several notorious 
 
 41 See L. Clovis Hirning, Indecent Exposure and Other Sex Offenses, 7 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCH. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 105 (1945); Jill S. Levenson et al., Public 
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Problems, 7 
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138 (2007); Tamara Rice Lave, Only 
Yesterday: The Rise and Fall of Twentieth Century Sexual Psychopathy Laws, 69 
LA. L. REV. 549, 551–64 (2009) (discussing a history of sexual psychopathy law 
and using a clinical approach to examine whether there was, in fact, a “sex crime 
wave”). 
 42 See Levenson et al., supra note 41, at 138 (“Sex offenders and sex crimes 
incite a great deal of fear among the general public and as a result, lawmakers 
have passed a variety of social policies designed to protect community members 
from sexual victimization.”). 
 43 J. Edgar Hoover, How Safe is Your Daughter?, AM. MAG., July–Dec. 1947, 
at 32 (“Should wild beasts break out of circus cages, a whole city would be mo-
bilized instantly. But depraved human beings, more savage than beasts, are per-
mitted to rove America almost at will.”). 
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crimes44 had generated widespread predator panic.45 Engendered, 
legislators and law enforcement nationwide set out to crack down 
on offenders, enacting sexual psychopath laws that allowed for the 
indefinite commitment and treatment of alleged sexual psycho-
paths.46 These laws drew constitutional criticism and were eventu-
ally nullified.47 History reflects, however, that any juncture of soci-
etal complacency would be yet again shaken by another eventual 
bout of unsettling sexual offenses.48 
For present purposes, in the early 1990s, another “wave”49 
sparked a torrent of legislative action. In 1994, following the abduc-
tion, molestation, and murder of eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling, 
Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and 
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, establishing the first 
national sex offender registry.50 In July of that same year, seven-
year-old Megan Kanka was lured from her front yard with promises 
of meeting her neighbor’s new puppy—her neighbor, who, 
 
 44 See, e.g., “Moon Maniac” Killer is Executed, HIST. (Nov. 13, 2009), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-moon-maniac (describing Al-
bert Fish, notorious child serial killer, who was executed for abduction, murder, 
and cannibalization of ten-year-old Grace Budd); ROBERT A. PRENTKY ET AL., 
SEXUAL PREDATORS 11 (2015) (“What has been referred to as ‘Horror Week’ oc-
curred in November 1949. Three children, aged 6, 7, and 17 months, were sex-
ually assaulted and murdered, all in less than one week.”); Russell B. Porter, 
Hauptmann Guilty, Sentenced to Death for the Murder of the Lindbergh Baby, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1935), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/
learning/general/onthisday/big/0213.html (describing trial of the kidnapping and 
murder of the infant son of aviation pioneer, Charles Lindbergh). 
 45 See Lave, supra note 41, at 549–51; see also Alan Greenblatt, Sex Offend-
ers: Will Tough, New Laws do more Harm than Good, 16 CQ RESEARCHER 721, 
721, 730, 733 (2006) (noting media’s tendency to focus coverage on “the worst 
cases of abduction and abuse,” which incited widespread public fear of sex 
crimes). 
 46 Lave, supra note 41, at 571–72 (“By 1967, twenty-six states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia had passed [sexual psychopath] laws.”). 
 47 Greenblatt, supra note 45, at 733. 
 48 See generally id. at 730–33 (describing “cycles” that occurred throughout 
the 20th century with regard to public reaction to sex offenders). 
 49 See generally Hirning, supra note 41, at 105 (describing occurrence of “sex 
crime waves”). 
 50 See Greenblatt, supra note 45, at 731; 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–14072 (2000). 
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unbeknownst to Megan’s parents, was a convicted sexual predator.51 
The child was raped, murdered, and within twenty-four hours, her 
body was found dumped in a local park.52 Public outrage ensued.53 
Within weeks, the state of New Jersey enacted Megan’s Law, re-
quiring law enforcement to notify communities when sex offenders 
moved to or resided in their neighborhoods.54 By the time Congress 
enacted a federal counterpart in 1996, Megan’s Law had passed in 
an additional thirty-five states.55 By the mid-1990s, mainstream me-
dia’s representation of sexual crimes “became increasingly domi-
nated by the figure of the ‘pedophile,’ understood as an individual 
with an incurable and uncontrollable desire for sexual contact with 
children.”56 
This wave carried over into the new millennium, and from 1996 
to 2003, Congress passed a series of bills “to enhance, clarify and 
strengthen the provisions of the Wetterling Act.”57 In 2006, Con-
gress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”), wholly rewriting the minimum federal standards for 
sex offender registration and notification by, among other things, 
expanding the number and types of sex offenses that require regis-
tration.58 
 
 51 Olivia B. Waxman, The History Behind the Law That Created a Registry 
of Sex Offenders, TIME (May 30, 2017, 9:30 AM), http://time.com/4793292/his-
tory-origins-sex-offender-registry/. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (1994). 
 55 Greenblatt, supra note 45, at 731, 735; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071(e), 
14072(f) (amending Wetterling Act, removing requirement that registry infor-
mation be kept confidential, and adding a mandatory community notification pro-
vision). 
 56 Tanya Serisier, Sex Crimes and the Media, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. (Jan. 2017), https://oxfordre.com/criminology/
view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079-e-
118. 
 57 For an overview of federal sex offender and notification laws, see Legisla-
tive History of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification, SMART OFF., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.smart.gov/legislation.htm. 
 58 See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 34 U.S.C. 
§§ 20911–20962. 
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To make clear, although Congress has its finger in the pie, sex 
offender registration is primarily conducted at the local level.59 
Every state and territory of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, and nearly 150 Native American tribes have established their 
own sex offender registration and notification systems.60 Each sys-
tem contains “its own nuances and distinct features,” including in-
dividual “determinations about who is required to register, what in-
formation offenders must provide, [and] which offenders are posted 
on the jurisdiction’s public registry website.”61 Nonetheless, regard-
less of the jurisdiction and its respective nuances, many of the re-
straints imposed on registered sex offenders share common charac-
teristics.62 
B. Consequences of Conviction: Sex Offender Restraints 
Generally, sex offenders are required to register and “update 
their registration in each jurisdiction they live, work, or attend 
school.”63 Often, offenders are categorized into tiers based on the 
severity of their offenses; these tiers in turn determine registration 
requirements, including how often an offender must report to the 
 
 59 SMART OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES 1 (2019), 
https://www.smart.gov/caselaw/Case-Law-Update-2019-Compiled.pdf [herein-
after CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES]; see also SMART OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., SORNA IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS 2 (2017), https://www.smart.gov/
pdfs/sorna/SORNAImplementationDocs.pdf (“[J]urisdictions that fail to substan-
tially implement SORNA are subject to a [ten] percent penalty reduction in its 
Byrne Justice Assistance Grant formula funds.”). 
 60 CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES, supra note 59, at 1. 
 61 Id. 
 62 For the sake of relative brevity, this Article will not address jurisdictional 
registration differences but will touch upon those commonly imposed. It is im-
portant to note—and this Article does recognize—that case law may turn on the 
individual restrictions—some more severe than others—imposed in a certain 
state, especially in the context of what amounts to a “significant restraint on lib-
erty” to suffice as “custody” for habeas purposes. 
 63 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and-noti-
fication-act-sorna (last updated May 28, 2020); 34 U.S.C. § 20913 (2018) (origi-
nally enacted as part of Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 
U.S.C. § 16913 (2006)). 
88 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:76 
 
state.64 Offenders are typically required to provide a verifiable ad-
dress, place of employment, current photograph, vehicle infor-
mation, and email address.65 Most states also impose residential re-
strictions, prohibiting offenders from residing within a certain zone 
of “schools, parks, day care centers, bus stops, or other places com-
monly frequented by children.”66 Sex offenders report difficulties 
finding and maintaining employment, threats and physical assault, 
as well as detrimental familial consequences.67 Certain states permit 
the indefinite civil commitment of individuals determined to be sex-
ually violent predators after completion of their prison term.68 A 
failure to register, keep current, or comply with registration re-
strictions subjects eligible offenders to separate charges—“often at 
 
 64 See Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-
Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 
697, 702–03 (2008). 
 65 See, e.g., Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1072–73 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (also requiring petitioner to appear annually at local sheriff’s office to 
be photographed and fingerprinted, as well as to provide any other internet iden-
tifiers). 
 66 Jill S. Levenson, Restricting Sex Offender Residences: Policy Implications, 
36 HUM. RTS. 21 (2009), see also People v. Oberlander, No. 02–354, 2008 WL 
3390455, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2008) (discussing case of a convicted sex 
offender who was unable to live within walking distance of a synagogue as re-
quired by Orthodox Jewish religion because he is forbidden to “reside, work or 
loiter” within [1000] feet of a “public or private, elementary, middle or high 
school, child care facility, park, playground, public or private youth center, or 
public swimming pool”). 
 67 Sarah W. Craun & David M. Bierie, Are the Collateral Consequences of 
Being a Registered Sex Offender as Bad as We Think?, 78 FED. PROB. June 2014, 
at 28–29 (“[B]etween 5 percent and 10 percent of registered sex offenders re-
ported being physically assaulted or injured, and 18 percent had their property 
damaged. Nearly half reported losing a friend due to being discovered as a regis-
tered sex offender.” (internal citation omitted)); see generally Ashley Kilmer & 
Chrysanthi S. Leon, “Nobody Worries About Our Children”: Unseen Impacts of 
Sex Offender Registration on Families with School-Age Children and Implica-
tions for Desistance, 30 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 181–82 (2017) (discussing impact of 
sex offender policies on children of registrants). 
 68 See Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued 
Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213, 214–15 (2011). These 
civil commitment statutes will not be discussed for our purposes but are men-
tioned as an example of the often-severe restraints imposed on convicted sex of-
fenders. 
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the felony level.”69 United States Supreme Court Justice David 
Souter, concurring in the Court’s decision to reject an ex post facto 
challenge to an Alaskan registration law, encapsulated the conse-
quences faced by registered sexual offenders: 
[T]here is significant evidence of onerous practical 
effects of being listed on a sex offender registry. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279 (2d Cir. 
1997) (noting “numerous instances in which sex of-
fenders have suffered harm in the aftermath of noti-
fication—ranging from public shunning, picketing, 
press vigils, ostracism, loss of employment, and 
eviction, to threats of violence, physical attacks, and 
arson”); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (“The record documents that registrants 
and their families have experienced profound humil-
iation and isolation as a result of the reaction of those 
notified. Employment and employment opportunities 
have been jeopardized or lost. Housing and housing 
opportunities have suffered a similar fate. Family 
and other personal relationships have been destroyed 
or severely strained. Retribution has been visited by 
private, unlawful violence and threats and, while 
such incidents of ‘vigilante justice’ are not common, 
they happen with sufficient frequency and publicity 
that registrants justifiably live in fear of 
them”) . . . .70 
Notably, these observations were made prior to Congress’s enact-
ment of SORNA, which—along with its state counterparts—made 
“sex offenders’ registration obligations considerably more 
 
 69 Logan, supra note 39, at 162–63 (footnotes omitted). 
 70 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 109 n.* (2003) (Souter, J., concurring). In the 
same decision, Justice Stevens found that the statutes “impose significant affirm-
ative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they apply.” Id. at 
111 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition to residential registration, offenders “may 
not shave their beards, color their hair, change their employer, or borrow a car 
without reporting those events to the authorities.” Id. 
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burdensome.”71 In many states, these requirements may be imposed 
for the entirety of an offender’s natural life.72 
III. DO THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
& NOTIFICATION LAWS SATISFY THE “IN CUSTODY” STANDARD FOR 
HABEAS RELIEF? 
Although these consequences are, as described by Justice 
Souter, “onerous,” whether they suffice to satisfy the habeas corpus 
“in-custody” requirement remains unsettled.73 Various federal cir-
cuit courts have maintained a uniform stance on the matter, over-
whelmingly in agreement that sex offender registration and notifi-
cation laws do not pose “the type of severe, immediate restraint[s] 
on physical liberty” required to establish custody.74 That is, until the 
Third Circuit weighed in. 
A.  The Circuit Courts Weigh In 
As the first federal appellate court to address the issue, the Ninth 
Circuit set the precedential bar in Williamson v. Gregoire.75 In de-
termining this “novel” question, the court “rel[ied] heavily on the 
notion of a physical sense of liberty—that is, whether the legal dis-
ability in question somehow limits the putative habeas petitioner’s 
movement.”76 Highlighting the physicality required for custodial re-
straints, the Ninth Circuit rejected registration and notification as 
“significant restraint[s] on Williamson’s physical liberty”77: 
The sex offender registration and notification provi-
sions apply to Williamson whether he stays in the 
same place or whether he moves. Indeed, even if 
 
 71 See Piasecki v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 72 See id. at 164. 
 73 Smith, 538 U.S. at 109 n.*. 
 74 Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999); see also William-
son v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 
518, 521–23 (6th Cir. 2002); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717–20 (7th Cir. 
2008); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 335–38 (4th Cir. 2012); Calhoun v. Att’y 
Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1073–74 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 75 Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1182. 
 76 Id. at 1182–83. 
 77 Id. at 1183. 
2020] SEXUAL OFFENDER LAWS AND FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF 91 
 
Williamson never leaves his house, he must still ver-
ify his address with the sheriff every year. The Wash-
ington sex offender law does not require Williamson 
even to personally appear at a sheriff’s office to reg-
ister; registration can be accomplished by mail. Thus, 
the law neither targets Williamson’s movement in or-
der to impose special requirements, nor demands his 
physical presence at any time or place. Furthermore, 
the law does not specify any place in Washington or 
anywhere else where Williamson may not go.78 
Because Williamson did not need government pre-approval so 
long as he complied with the notice requirements, the court distin-
guished the affirmative physical movements required in situations 
such as parole and recognizance release, and an outright prohibition 
on certain physical movements.79 Therefore, the court held, “Wil-
liamson cannot say that there is anywhere that the sex offender law 
prevents him from going.”80 The court continued by acknowledging 
that, although Williamson may be disincentivized to move or travel, 
any such disincentive was the result of a “subjective chill,” and thus, 
was insufficient to establish custody.81 
Equating registration laws to restitution orders, the Ninth Circuit 
went on to reject any argument that the “mere potential for future 
incarceration, without any present restraint on liberty, can satisfy the 
‘in custody’ requirement.”82 Though any such incarceration would 
undoubtedly limit Williamson’s movement, the court emphasized 
that this potentiality was entirely dependent on Williamson’s will-
ingness to obey the law.83 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit buttressed its 
decision by reinforcing its previous determination that 
 
 78 Id. at 1184. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1184. 
 81 Id. (“Certainly, the loss of a driver’s license amounts to a much greater 
limitation on one’s freedom of movement than does the Washington sex offender 
law, but the former does not satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirement either.”). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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Washington’s sex offender law is regulatory rather than punitive.84 
The “civil” nature of the law therefore “bolster[ed] [its] conclusion 
that the registration and notification provisions are more analogous 
to a loss of the right to vote or own firearms, or the loss of a profes-
sional license, rather than probation or parole.”85 Thus, the petitioner 
was not in custody for federal habeas purposes.86 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s rationale was threefold: (1) the court 
focused on the physicality of custody, looking to affirmative re-
straints on a petitioner’s “movement”; (2) the “mere potential for 
future incarceration” is insufficient; and (3) the regulations are re-
medial rather than punitive.87 
Until early 2019, the federal appellate bench uniformly applied 
this rationale throughout the circuits. Relying almost exclusively on 
the language of Williamson and its Ninth Circuit progeny,88 the 
Sixth, Seventh, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have each reaffirmed this 
trinity of custodial analysis.89 This is so despite clear factual differ-
ences specific to each case—both procedurally and statutorily. For 
example, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits rejected similar claims from 
petitioners who were currently incarcerated while their petitions for 
habeas were pending.90 The Seventh Circuit explained that, because 
it deemed sex offender registration noncustodial, the court did not 
have pendent jurisdiction over the claim—despite the fact that reg-
istration was required under the same sentence petitioner was cur-
rently incarcerated and his habeas petition included an independent 
 
 84 Id. (citing Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (deter-
mining whether Washington sex offender statute constituted punishment for ex 
post facto purposes)). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999); McNab v. 
Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 89 See Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 522–23 (6th Cir. 2002); Virsnieks v. 
Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 
337–39 (4th Cir. 2012); Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 
(10th Cir. 2014). 
 90 Leslie, 296 F.3d at 522 (“Although Leslie is currently incarcerated, he is 
not seeking relief from the conviction or sentence upon which his confinement is 
based.”); Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 719–22. 
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custodial claim.91 Further, although the Williamson court empha-
sized that the law did not require in-person registration,92 its sister 
circuits have summarily extended the holding to statutes that do.93 
As recently as 2016, the Tenth Circuit, while acknowledging Okla-
homa’s registration requirements as more restrictive than those it 
considered in the past, conclusively—that is, without discussion of 
any statutory specificities—decided that they do not “impose a se-
vere restraint on [petitioner’s] freedom sufficient to satisfy the ‘in 
custody’ requirement of § 2254.”94 Sex offender registration and no-
tification schemes have evolved to become increasingly burden-
some; however, the judicial system had seemingly turned a blind 
eye. 
In March of 2019, a split emerged. Thus, so too did a glimmer 
of hope for those wishing to use habeas as a vehicle to challenge 
their sex offender registration. In Piasecki v. Court of Common 
Pleas, the Third Circuit explicitly departed from its sister circuits, 
finding registration requirements imposed “severe restraints 
on . . . liberty not shared by the public generally,” and thus, 
amounted to custody.95 Indeed, the court found the question “easily 
answered.”96 Emphasizing that post-SORNA restrictions are more 
onerous than those of earlier decisions, the panel noted specific re-
straints imposed on the petitioner: 
At a minimum, Piasecki was required “to be in a cer-
tain place” or “one of several places”—a State Police 
 
 91 Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 722 (“Given the [habeas] statute’s uniform focus on 
custodial sentences, ‘there is . . . no reason why the presence of a plausible claim 
against a custodial punishment should make a noncustodial punishment more 
amenable to collateral review that it otherwise might be.’” (quoting Kaminski v. 
United States, 339 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2003))). 
 92 Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184. 
 93 Leslie, 296 F.3d at 521–22 (holding that Ohio’s sex offender registration, 
requiring in-person registration, did not constitute custody); Wilson, 689 F.3d at 
338 (same conclusion for Virginia and Texas statutes); Calhoun, 745 F.3d at 
1072–73 (same conclusion for Colorado statute); see also Henry, 164 F.3d at 1242 
(“Registration, even if it must be done in person at the police station, does not 
constitute the type of severe, immediate restraint on physical liberty necessary to 
render a petitioner ‘in custody’ for the purposes of federal habeas relief.”). 
 94 Dickey v. Allbaugh, 664 F. App’x 690, 693 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 95 Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161, 172–72 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 96 Id. at 170. 
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barracks—at least four times a year for the rest of his 
life. The state’s ability to compel a petitioner’s at-
tendance weighs heavily in favor of concluding that 
the petitioner was in custody . . . .Any change of ad-
dress, including any temporary stay at a different res-
idence, required an accompanying trip to the State 
Police barracks within three business days. He was 
even required to regularly report to police if he had 
no address and became homeless. In addition, Pias-
ecki could have no “computer internet use.” The 
SORNA statute also compelled Piasecki to person-
ally report to the State Police if he operated a car, 
began storing his car in a different location, changed 
his phone number, or created a new email address.97 
Accordingly, the court found that petitioner “was not free to ‘come 
and go as he please[d],’”98 and these “compulsory, physical re-
straints not shared by the public generally . . . severely conditioned 
his freedom of movement.”99 The court specifically rejected other 
circuits’ reliance on government “pre-approval” as the litmus for 
custody and further emphasized that “any failure to abide by the re-
strictions” subjected Piasecki to felony charges.100 Therefore, 
“[g]iven the level of restriction imposed by the registration require-
ments and the harsh consequences that would result from failing to 
adhere to them,” the Third Circuit held that these restrictions were 
“severe” and “clearly r[o]se to the level of ‘custody’ for purposes of 
[its] habeas jurisdiction.”101 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT COMES CLOSE 
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the conse-
quences of sex offender registration and notification laws satisfy the 
 
 97 Id. at 170–71 (footnotes omitted) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.15(a)–
(g) (West 2018)). 
 98 Id. at 170 (quoting Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). 
 99 Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351). 
 100 Id. at 171–72. 
 101 Id. at 171, 173. 
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“in-custody” standard.102 With the recent emergence of a circuit 
split, however, the Supreme Court could undertake the opportunity 
to resolve the issue. This would not be the Court’s first attempt. 
A. United States v. Juvenile Male 
In 2010, the Court came close. In the per curiam decision of 
United States v. Juvenile Male,103 the Court, considering the gov-
ernment’s petition for a writ of certiorari, postponed addressing the 
Ninth Circuit’s determination that SORNA violates the Ex Post 
Facto Clause as applied to juveniles adjudicated delinquent prior to 
SORNA’s enactment.104 First, the Court noted, it was required to 
address its own jurisdictional limitations: the justiciability of the 
case due to mootness.105 
For context, in 2005—prior to the enactment of SORNA—the 
respondent, “Juvenile Male,” was charged with juvenile delin-
quency in the United States District Court for the District of Mon-
tana for “knowingly engaging in sexual acts with a person under 12 
years of age.”106 The respondent pled “true” to the charge and was 
subsequently adjudicated delinquent.107 The respondent was sen-
tenced to two years of “official detention and juvenile delinquent 
supervision until his [twenty-first] birthday.”108 Additionally, the 
 
 102 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (explaining that, once a peti-
tioner’s sentence has expired, he must show a “collateral consequence” in order 
to maintain a suit). 
 103 United States v. Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. 558 (2010) (per curiam). 
 104 Id. at 560; see United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 927–28 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
 105 Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 560. For a (slightly dated) discussion on federal 
jurisdictional limitations of mootness, see Sidney A. Diamond, Federal Jurisdic-
tion to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 125–27 (1946). 
In the United States federal courts, this [mootness] limitation is 
more than a rule of decision; it is a constitutional requirement. 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution confines the jurisdic-
tion of the federal judicial system to “cases” and “controver-
sies.” A lawsuit which is, or has become, moot is neither a case 
nor a controversy in the constitutional sense and no federal 
court has the power to decide it. 
Id. at 125–26 (internal citations omitted). 
 106 Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 559. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
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court ordered respondent to “spend the first six months of his juve-
nile supervision in a prerelease center and to abide by the center’s 
conditions of residency.”109 
In the midst of respondent’s sentence, Congress enacted 
SORNA, which, with respect to juvenile offenders, requires juve-
niles adjudicated delinquent for certain serious sex offenses to com-
ply with registration requirements in each jurisdiction where they 
live, work, and attend school.110 In February of 2007, the Attorney 
General issued an interim rule that applied SORNA’s requirements 
“to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the of-
fense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of 
[SORNA].”111 Effectively, this rule mandated that SORNA’s sex 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id.; see 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–20945 (Sex Offender Registration and Notifi-
cation). 
 111 Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8897 (Feb. 
28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2012)). As an aside, the Supreme Court 
recently issued an opinion in the case Gundy v. United States, in which Hernan 
Gundy challenged the provisions of SORNA that give the United States Attorney 
General the discretion to decide whether the registration and notifications require-
ments should apply to offenders convicted pre-enactment. Gundy v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). Gundy argued that those provisions were violative of the 
nondelegation doctrine, which prohibits Congress from delegating broad legisla-
tive functions to the executive branch. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–6, 
Gundy, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (No. 17-6086). A decision finding the SORNA provision 
an impermissible delegation of authority to the executive branch could have ar-
guably raised habeas implications. The “‘historical core’ of the writ is tethered to 
the notion that non-judicial—i.e., executive or legislative—detentions warrant 
substantive review and oversight by a neutral judicial branch.” LYON ET AL., supra 
note 7, at 9 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2007)). There are, of 
course, nuances about registration requirements that may render this a moot point, 
such as whether they amount to custody to begin with and whether they are the 
product of a full hearing, but nevertheless, the broad concept that the Attorney 
General—a member of the executive branch—is entitled to determine whether 
pre-enactment offenders must comply by the restrictions would have further sup-
port the idea that sex offender registration and notification provisions perhaps fall 
within the historical scope of habeas corpus as quasi-executive detention.  
  Alas, the Supreme Court did not so hold. And, thus, any nuanced habeas 
implications were thereby temporarily extinguished—with emphasis on tempo-
rarily. The dissenting Justices, as well as Justice Alito in the concurrence, indi-
cated a strong desire to reconsider the way the Court has analyzed nondelegation 
arguments over the past eighty-four years. Gundy, 138 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J., 
concurring); id. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). And with the Court’s recent 
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offender registration requirements applied to all sex offenders, in-
cluding those who were charged with qualifying pre-enactment of-
fenses.112 
As Murphy’s Law would have it, in July 2007, the district court 
found that Juvenile Male had failed to comply with the requirements 
of the prerelease program and revoked his supervision, mandating 
an additional six-month term of detention followed by a period of 
supervision up until his twenty-first birthday.113 In addition, the gov-
ernment invoked SORNA’s pre-enactment registration provisions, 
arguing that respondent should also be required to register as a sex 
offender.114 The judge agreed, and, as “special conditions” of his 
supervision, ordered the respondent to register as a sex offender.115 
Respondent appealed this “special condition” of supervision to the 
Ninth Circuit.116 
In May 2008, with his appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit, re-
spondent turned twenty-one.117 Thus, his juvenile supervision ex-
pired, including the provisions requiring him to register as a sex of-
fender.118 Subsequently, without addressing any issue of mootness, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the retroactive application of SORNA in 
the juvenile adjudication context violates the Ex Post Facto Clause 
and vacated the sex offender registration requirements imposed by 
the district court as a condition of respondent’s juvenile supervi-
sion.119 Nonetheless, by the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, re-
spondent had registered as a sex offender in Montana.120 
 
trajectory matching the conservative voices in the dissent, this could indicate a 
redetermination of the merits of Gundy’s arguments. Then again, nondelegation 
arguments arise in varying contexts—not just under SORNA—so if the Court 
were to undertake the argument once again, it could very well be in one of these 
alternative contexts and Gundy’s SORNA implications may remain.  
 112 See 28 C.F.R. § 72.3; see also Anna Christensen, SORNA and the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2010, 9:00 PM), https://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2010/02/sorna-and-the-ex-post-facto-clause/. 
 113 Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 559. 
 114 Id. at 559–60. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.; United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 117 See Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 560. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id.; see Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d at 927. 
 120 Juvenile Male, 560 U.S. at 560–61. 
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Based on these facts, the Supreme Court deferred ruling on the 
ex post facto issue and, instead, certified the following question to 
the Montana Supreme Court: 
Is respondent’s duty to remain registered as a sex of-
fender under Montana law contingent upon the va-
lidity of the conditions of his now-expired federal ju-
venile-supervision order that required him to register 
as a sex offender, or is the duty an independent re-
quirement of Montana law that is unaffected by the 
validity or invalidity of the federal juvenile-supervi-
sion conditions?121 
Because respondent solely challenged the conditions of his juvenile 
supervision requiring him to register as a sex offender, and because 
that term of supervision had since expired, the Court found that the 
case was likely moot “unless respondent [could] show that a deci-
sion invalidating the sex-offender-registration conditions of his ju-
venile supervision would be sufficiently likely to redress ‘collateral 
consequences adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact require-
ment.’”122 
B.  The Court Throws a Bone 
Though not directly deciding the mootness issue itself, the Court 
highlighted that “the most likely potential ‘collateral consequenc[e]’ 
that might be remedied by a judgment in respondent’s favor is the 
requirement that respondent remain registered as a sex offender un-
der Montana law.”123 Thus, the Court sought to ascertain “whether 
a favorable decision in [respondent’s] case would make it suffi-
ciently likely that respondent ‘could remove his name and identify-
ing information from the Montana sex offender registry.’”124 Essen-
tially, the Court wanted to know whether the separate registration 
under Montana law derived from, or was caused by, the federal dis-
trict court’s order that had since expired.125 Was respondent’s 
 
 121 Id. at 561 (internal citations omitted). 
 122 Id. at 560 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14 (1998)). 
 123 Id. at 560–61. 
 124 Id. at 561 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Juvenile Male 560 
U.S. 558 (No. 09-940)). 
 125 See id. at 560–61. 
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Montana sex offender registration a collateral consequence of his 
federal sentence?126 
Unfortunately for respondent, the Montana Supreme Court clar-
ified that respondent’s “state law duty to remain registered as a sex 
offender [was] not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of 
his federal supervision order” and continued to apply regardless of 
the outcome of his federal appeal.127 Satisfied, the Supreme Court 
ruled that respondent’s appeal was moot, that as such, the Ninth Cir-
cuit lacked any power to decide the ex post facto issue, and that the 
judgment was vacated with remand instructions to dismiss.128 The 
Court also rejected respondent’s argument against mootness based 
on “‘an independent duty to register as a sex offender’ under 
SORNA itself,” finding that “the duty to register under SORNA is 
not a consequence—collateral or otherwise—of the District Court’s 
special conditions of supervision.”129 Respondent’s statutory duty to 
register under SORNA was an obligation independent of his super-
vision conditions.130 
In sum, respondent’s conviction left him with three distinct du-
ties to register as a sex offender: (1) as a condition of his juvenile 
supervision pursuant to the district court’s order; (2) independently 
under the requirements of the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender 
Registration Act; and (3) as an independent statutory duty pursuant 
to SORNA.131 His appeal challenged only the first, and thus, when 
 
 126 See id. 
 127 United States v. Juvenile Male, 255 P.3d 110, 111 (Mont. 2011). The Mon-
tana Supreme Court based its ruling on the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender 
Registration Act (“SVORA”), which was enacted in 1989, and “generally imposes 
a lifetime requirement, unless relieved by court order, upon sexual offenders to 
register with a law enforcement agency when present in Montana.” Id. at 112; see 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-506(1), 46-23-506 (3) (West 2009). Under Montana 
law, sexual offenders convicted in other jurisdictions for offenses “reasonably 
equivalent” to state sexual offenses are required to register under SVORA. Juve-
nile Male, 255 P.3d at 112. Therefore, because the court found respondent’s fed-
eral conviction to be “reasonably equivalent” to Montana’s sexual assault on a 
child offense, respondent’s duty to register as a sex offender in Montana was “en-
tirely independent from the registration conditions imposed by his federal super-
vision order.” Id. at 115. 
 128 United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937–39 (2011) (per curiam). 
 129 Id. at 937–38. 
 130 Id. at 938. 
 131 See generally id. at 933–39. 
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it expired, so too did the justiciability of his appeal.132 The Court 
simply lacked Article III jurisdiction.133 
Despite the Court’s narrow dismissal as applied to respondent’s 
appeal, the Court’s dicta suggests that sex offender registration re-
quirements—if challenged properly—could suffice as collateral 
consequences sufficiently restrictive for habeas jurisdiction.134 Sim-
ilar to Carafas and Sibron, Juvenile Male can be viewed as a moot-
ness case informed by the habeas “in custody” requirement. Note, 
however, that the case was not decided in the posture of a habeas 
petition, nor does the Court mention “custody” in either of its two 
opinions. But the Court’s reliance on Spencer v. Kemna—a habeas 
“in custody” decision—to determine its jurisdictional limits based 
on a collateral consequence issue could reflect—or imply—the 
Court’s view on whether sexual offender registration requirements 
are sufficient restraints on liberty to deem an offender “in custody” 
for habeas purposes.135 
V.  THE CONSEQUENCE OF PRECEDENT: REGISTRATION 
REQUIREMENTS AS A SEVERE RESTRAINT ADEQUATE FOR HABEAS 
REVIEW? 
Should the Supreme Court accept the opportunity to decide the 
issue, it may find itself in a somewhat self-imposed conundrum. 
 
 132 See id. at 934, 937–38. 
 133 Id. at 938–39. 
 134 Id. at 937 (“True, a favorable decision in this case might serve as a useful 
precedent for respondent in a hypothetical lawsuit challenging Montana’s regis-
tration requirement on ex post facto grounds. But this possible, indirect benefit in 
a future lawsuit cannot save this case from mootness.”). Additionally, the Court 
noted that SORNA’s “continuing obligation [to register] might provide grounds 
for a preenforcement challenge to SORNA’s registration requirements. It does 
not, however, render the current controversy regarding the validity of respond-
ent’s sentence any less moot.” Id. at 938. 
 135 See id. at 935; Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 14 (1998). On the other 
hand, the Court has denied certiorari in subsequent cases arising from the same, 
or sufficiently similar, challenges to sex offender registration requirements. See 
Calhoun v. Suthers, 135 S. Ct. 376, 376 (2014) (mem.); Brief for the Petitioner at 
5-11, Calhoun, 135 S. Ct. 376 (No. 14-216); Wilson v. Flaherty, 133 S. Ct. 2853, 
2853 (2013) (mem.); Brief for the Petitioner at 1, 8–20, Wilson, 133 S.Ct. 2853 
(No. 12-986); Dickey v. Allbaugh, 137 S. Ct. 2293, 2293 (2016) (mem.); Brief 
for the Petitioner at 1, 8–12, Dickey, 137 S. Ct. 2293 (No. 16-1006). 
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Based on the Court’s custodial jurisprudence, modern sex offender 
registration requirements, and the restraints thereby imposed, un-
doubtedly amount to custody for habeas purposes. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s findings in other contexts, paired with well-founded policy 
concerns, may inhibit the Court from extending its habeas jurisdic-
tion. 
A. Turning a Blind Eye – The Practical Effects of Sex 
Offender Registries as Habeas Custody 
A finding that the deprivations on liberty incident to modern sex 
offender registration requirements are anything short of “severe” is 
patently at odds with the practical effects of such requirements. 
Even if weight is to be afforded to Williamson’s narrow reliance on 
physical restraints of movement,136 the increasingly onerous re-
quirements and limitations imposed on sex offenders undoubtedly 
satisfy this standard137—despite the politically and judicially expe-
dient findings of the federal appellate courts.138 The severity of these 
restraints—significantly burdensome even at first blush—is com-
pounded by the tangible and intangible effects deriving from such 
limitations. 
As discussed, offenders are required to register and keep the 
state constantly apprised of their whereabouts, including where they 
live, work, and travel.139 However, registration requirements have 
further evolved to ensure that offenders are in fact limited in their 
movements, acting in effect to quarantine registrants to designated 
areas of the community.140 Residency restrictions, for example, are 
some of the more egregious aspects of registration requirements in 
terms of restraints on movement.141 Empirical data confirms that 
such “buffer zones,” which prohibit residency within a certain 
 
 136 See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 137 See supra Part II.B. 
 138 See supra Part III.A. See generally Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184; 
Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 722 (7th Cir. 2008); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 
518, 522 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 139 See, 34 U.S.C. § 20913; Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(SORNA), supra note 59. 
 140 See Jill S. Levenson & Andrea L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Re-
strictions: Unintended Consequences and Community Reentry, 9 JUST. RSCH. & 
POL’Y 59, 63 (2007). 
 141 See id. 
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proximity to places frequented by children, leave offenders with lit-
tle housing availability, and often force offenders into isolation, un-
able to live with their own family members.142 In the vast majority 
of metropolitan and suburban areas, one would be hard-pressed to 
find compliant housing not within close proximity to a school, day 
care center, park, or bus stop.143  
For instance, in Orange County, Florida, ninety-nine percent 
(99%) of all residential properties fall within a buffer zone.144 In 
Newark, New Jersey, ninety-three percent (93%) of residences are 
located within 2,500 feet of a school, and a study of four metropol-
itan areas in South Carolina found that forty-five percent (45%) of 
housing is within 1,000 feet of a school or day care center.145 When 
Miami-Dade County adopted an ordinance banning sex offenders 
from living within a 2,500-foot buffer zone, Miami’s Julia Tuttle 
Causeway became a state-sanctioned encampment of tents and 
shacks specifically designated for such offenders.146 Homelessness 
was the sole legal option for those wishing to legally reside in the 
county.147  
To claim that offenders subject to such restrictions “cannot say 
that there is anywhere that the sex offender law prevents [them] from 
going” is to rule in purposeful disregard of not only the actual, phys-
ical restraints imposed on offenders, but of the very explicit lan-
guage of the restrictions themselves.148 Blind adherence to the Wil-
liamson rationale is anachronistic to current reality. 
Rather, judicial interpretation of these requirements should aim 
to keep pace with the ever-increasing burdens imposed by new 
 
 142 Id. at 61–63. 
 143 See generally Levenson, supra note 66. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Greg Allen, Sex Offenders Forced To Live Under Miami Bridge, NPR 
(May 20, 2009, 2:33PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?sto-
ryId=104150499 (“‘You don’t lose votes by being tough on sex offenders,’ [col-
umnist Fred Grimm] says. ‘We’ve all seen . . . spontaneous homeless camps pop 
up. But this is a camp created by public policy.’”). 
 147 See id. 
 148 See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998); see also 
Calhoun v. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[Peti-
tioner] is free to live, work, travel, and engage in all legal activities without limi-
tation and without approval by a government official.”). 
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registration regimes. As Judge Andre Davis of the Fourth Circuit 
noted, “viewed pragmatically, as they should be, the requirements 
operate de facto as probationary terms, the violation of which are 
expected to lead to the imposition, upon conviction, of custodial sen-
tences.”149 As such, registration and notification requirements are 
entitled to the same custodial interpretation as applied to parole,150 
probation,151 bail,152 personal recognizance release,153 pendent con-
secutive sentences,154 community service,155 and fourteen hours of 
required alcohol rehabilitation classes156—all of which have been 
upheld as sufficiently custodial for habeas purposes.157 Further, the 
increased prevalence of in-person registration requirements creates 
a scheme more analogous to parole, and the Jones Court’s illustra-
tion of significant restraints on liberty—such as confinement to a 
particular “community, home, [and] job”—are more in line with the 
practical realities facing registered sex offenders today than the 
mere loss of a license as described in Williamson.158 As the Supreme 
Court has made clear, “[i]t is not relevant that conditions and re-
strictions such as these may be desirable and important parts of the 
rehabilitative process; what matters is that they significantly restrain 
[a] petitioner’s liberty to do those things which in this country free 
men are entitled to do.”159 
This conclusion is further bolstered by the legislative origins of 
sex offender registration regulations, which “were conceived as 
 
 149 Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2012) (Davis, J., concur-
ring). 
 150 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242–43 (1963). 
 151 See Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978); Caldwell 
v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that probation and deferred 
probation orders are custodial for habeas purposes); Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 
74, 78–79 (1st Cir. 2003) (same); Malinovsky v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 7 F.3d 
1263, 1265 (6th Cir. 1993) (same). 
 152 Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 286 n.2, 291 n.8 (1975). 
 153 Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 346 (1973). 
 154 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968). 
 155 Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Prob. Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 156 Dow v. Cir. Ct. First Cir., 995 F.2d 922, 922–23 (9th Cir. 1993) (per cu-
riam). 
 157 Logan, supra note 39, at 153 (collecting cases). 
 158 Compare Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963), with William-
son v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 159 Jones, 371 U.S. at 242–43. 
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means to discourage criminals from locating in an area in the first 
place, and as a ready basis for arrest should the registration require-
ment not be met.”160 As quoted in Professor Logan’s article, an early 
commentator stated: 
The immediate objectives of these ordinances ap-
peared to be the incarceration or expulsion of unde-
sirables, rather than the registration of criminals. It 
was believed that the individuals affected would 
move elsewhere to avoid registration. However, as 
more jurisdictions adopted these ordinances, a con-
victed person would be less able and less likely to 
escape registration by moving. Therefore, the princi-
pal mode of evasion would tend to become a failure 
to register with the consequent fulfillment of only the 
incarceration objective.161 
Failing to recognize the practical effects of sex offender registration 
requirements for what they are—and what they were fully intended 
to be—is tantamount to turning a judicial blind eye to both precedent 
and reality. 
B. Why the Court May Not Budge 
Both instinctually and as a matter of precedent, sex offender reg-
istration and notification requirements amount to the breed of severe 
restraints on liberty sufficient for the jurisdictional reach of habeas 
custody. To hold otherwise would simply perpetuate a legal fiction. 
Nonetheless, prudential reasons exist as to why the Supreme Court 
may either refuse to extend habeas custody to registration, or refuse 
to address the issue at all, choosing instead to maintain the jurispru-
dential status quo of the lower courts. 
 
 160 Logan, supra note 39, at 159 (noting that another basic foundation of reg-
istration regulations was the idea that sex offenders pose a heightened risk of re-
cidivism). 
 161 Id. (quoting Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over 
Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 63 (1954)). 
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1. THE “PUNISHMENT” HURDLE 
As made clear by Williamson and its progeny, numerous appel-
late circuits have determined that sex offender registration and noti-
fication laws are remedial rather than punitive.162 The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly affirmed this concept,163 and in fact, has further 
determined that indefinite civil commitment of sex offenders does 
not run afoul of the Constitution for similar reasons.164 In Smith v. 
John Doe, for example, the Court concluded that the legislature in-
tended to create a “civil, nonpunitive regime,” and registration re-
quirements do not impose punitive restraints based largely on the 
“Act’s rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose”—public safety 
and concern about recidivism.165 And, as previously discussed, the 
lower federal circuits have consistently upheld the finding that these 
statutory schemes are civil rather than punitive as consonant with 
the finding that sex offender registration requirements amount to 
mere collateral consequences insufficient for habeas custody.166 
 
 162 Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184 (citing Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 
1093 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 163 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91–92, 94–95 (2003). 
 164 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (“If detention for the 
purpose of protecting the community from harm necessarily constituted punish-
ment, then all involuntary civil commitments would have to be considered pun-
ishment. But we have never so held.”); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) 
(clarifying the Hendricks holding that there must be a lack-of-control determina-
tion for civil commitment to be considered constitutional). 
 165 Smith, 538 U.S. at 96, 102–03. 
 166 Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184 (“Another reason to find that the Washington 
sex offender law creates a mere collateral consequence of conviction is . . . that 
the Washington law is ‘regulatory and not punitive,’ and therefore did not amount 
to punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause.”) (citing Russell 
v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 
523 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Although ‘the “in custody” requirement may be satisfied by 
restraints other than criminal punishment,” the Ohio Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that the sexual-predator statute is a form of civil regulation provides additional 
support for our conclusion that the classification, registration, and community no-
tification provisions are more analogous to collateral consequences . . . than to 
severe restraints on freedom of movement such as parole.”) (Clay, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184)); Virsnieks v. Smith, 
521 F.3d 707, 720 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Wisconsin sexual offender registration 
statute is considered remedial, rather than punitive, in nature.”); Calhoun v. Att’y 
Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Moreover, the Colorado 
sex-offender registration requirements are remedial, not punitive.”). 
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The Supreme Court’s potential worry, therefore, is that the in-
verse may be true. A finding that sex offender registration require-
ments amount to custody for habeas purposes may belie the Court’s 
findings in the ex post facto and double jeopardy contexts that these 
requirements do not amount to punishment.167 While the custodial 
requirement may be satisfied by both civil and criminal restraints,168 
equating registration requirements to probation or parole may con-
sequently give life to the argument that they are in fact punitive 
criminal sentencing measures and not “remedial” as legislatures 
claim. Because the Court has gone to great lengths to uphold these 
schemes, this is a revitalization that the Court is unlikely to resusci-
tate of its own accord. 
In sum, the Court may worry that a finding contrary to William-
son may undermine its own precedent, consequently re-exposing 
sex offender registration laws to constitutional attack as violative 
punitive regimes. 
2.  CURBED BY CONGRESS: THE GREATNESS OF THE WRIT 
Additionally, though many academic and social commentators 
make much ado about the ideological greatness of the writ of habeas 
corpus—and argue for expansions of its reach in line with that ide-
ology169—such criticisms seem to overlook the engrained under-
standing that Congress has the power to confer habeas jurisdiction 
upon the federal judiciary.170 As discussed, habeas custody is juris-
dictional.171 While a discussion of Congress’s role in an area that 
has been stifled judicially172 may seem tangential, it may also act to 
inform our understanding of the judiciary’s refusal to extend habeas 
custody beyond the scope already established. That is, though 
 
 167 See, e.g., Leslie, 296 F.3d at 523. 
 168 Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184. 
 169 See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, The Withered Writ, AM. PROSPECT (July 15, 
2013), https://prospect.org/article/withered-writ (“The writ of habeas cor-
pus . . . worked like an incantation to break an evil spell.”); Emanuel Margolis, 
Habeas Corpus: The No Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557, 563 (1994); 
Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
9, 35 (1990). 
 170 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 83–84 (1807). 
 171 See supra Part I. 
 172 This is true of courts following the Williamson rationale. Williamson, 151 
F.3d at 1184. 
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Congress has not expressly delineated what does and does not con-
stitute “custody”—meaning it has not statutorily ruled out sex of-
fender registration—the federal judiciary’s overwhelming refusal to 
extend custody to such requirements may be the consequence of an 
underlying understanding between both branches that the writ has 
not been considered “a generally available federal remedy for every 
violation of federal rights.”173 
Recent history has “not been generous to habeas.”174 Congress 
has remained unsubtle about its aspirations to limit the power of ha-
beas corpus and to establish formalistic procedural hurdles, many of 
which are often insurmountable for the average prisoner.175 Its en-
actment of AEDPA is a manifestation of such aspirations.176 
Broadly, the law bans successive petitions, sets a one-year statute of 
limitations for habeas claims, narrows the grounds upon which suc-
cessful habeas claims can be made, and allows claims only to the 
extent that challenged convictions are contrary to “clearly estab-
lished federal law” or an “unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence . . . .”177 The Act’s curtailment of both the pro-
cedural and substantive scope of the writ has been—and continues 
to be—discussed at length by others elsewhere.178 For our purposes, 
it is an example that tends to imply that the judiciary’s limited inter-
pretation of its habeas jurisdiction may in fact be more in line with 
the recent spirit of the writ—which critics consistently claim neces-
sitates evolution on par with the current times.179 One may argue 
that these limitations have in fact done just that. 
 
 173 Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 
(1982). 
 174 Logan, supra note 39, at 148. 
 175 See id. 
 176 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996); see Caplan, supra note 6 (explaining that 
AEDPA “gutted the federal writ of habeas corpus”). 
 177 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
 178 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: 
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–12 (1997) (discussing various 
reform proposals for habeas law). 
 179 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 39, at 149 (“In short, the Article argues that 
habeas, as it has for centuries, must evolve in a manner sensitive to contemporary 
methods of social control, in this instance the government’s aggressive use of in-
formation to achieve control beyond the walls of prison.”). Other articles have 
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This is not to say that the Court should inappropriately relinquish 
its role as the ultimate arbiter of federal liberties to appease congres-
sional whims. Yet, whether or not one may agree with the value of 
limiting the scope of the Great Writ—especially absent explicit con-
gressional mandate to do so—it is undoubted that the legislature’s 
clear intent to constrain access to habeas relief will play a role in the 
Court’s consideration of whether to extend habeas custody to sex 
offender registration requirements. 
Thus, given the recent trajectory of the country’s restrictions on 
habeas, the evolution of the writ’s “spirit” may lend itself more to-
ward a conservative jurisdictional interpretation of habeas custody. 
3.  FINALITY 
Finally, finality. A long-standing antagonist to the Great Writ, 
the concept of finality has rendered federal courts “reluctant to ex-
tend the writ beyond its historic purpose.”180 Underlying finality 
concerns are that of federalism.181 The Supreme Court has consist-
ently emphasized that federal habeas creates a “profound interfer-
ence with state judicial systems and the finality of state decisions,” 
and thus, “should be reserved for those instances in which the fed-
eral interest in individual liberty is so strong that it outweighs feder-
alism and finality concerns.”182 A federal habeas scheme that fails 
to account for finality would “subvert the criminal process itself.”183 
There are distinctions inherent in sex offender registration and 
notification regimes that make concerns of finality particularly ap-
parent. For example, as briefly discussed in Juvenile Male, sex 
 
argued that the legislature should itself endeavor to explicitly expand habeas cus-
tody to registered sex offenders. See Wendy R. Calaway, Sex Offenders, Custody 
and Habeas, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 794 (2018). But, as Professor Calaway 
notes, this is a “futile” and “unlikely” resolution. Id. 
 180 Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512–13 
(1982). 
 181 Id. at 515–16. 
 182 Id. at 516; see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Ha-
beas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 525 (1963) (“I rest partly 
on the federalist premise, that the abrasions and conflicts created by federal inter-
ference with the states’ administration of criminal justice should be avoided in the 
absence of felt need . . . .”). 
 183 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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offender registration laws create independent duties to register once 
convicted of an applicable sexual offense.184 That is, though regis-
tration requirements are routinely imposed at sentencing “as a man-
datory condition of supervised release,”185 sex offenders are also in-
dividually required to register—not as a matter of sentencing per se, 
but as an independent statutory duty, the violation of which consti-
tutes a separate criminal offense.186 If the requirements were not im-
posed expressly as part of a petitioner’s sentence, then the subse-
quent expiration of the sentence would technically constitute an un-
conditional release, thereby contrary to the Jones Court’s extension 
of habeas custody to a petitioner whose “release from physical con-
finement under the sentence in question was not unconditional.”187 
Thus, even if the Court were to find sex offender registration re-
quirements severely restrictive, in order to find them custodial, the 
Court would arguably have to extend habeas custody to restrictions 
not actually imposed as part of a criminal sentence.188 This exten-
sion of habeas is surely not in accord with concerns of finality.189 
This is bolstered by the fact that sex offender registration 
schemes are often conducted at the local level, and thus, there is an 
even greater “tension between the State’s interest in finality and the 
asserted federal interest” of access to habeas relief.190 
Further, an absence of finality undermines the penological goals 
of the criminal justice system—namely, the rehabilitative 
 
 184 See United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 938 (2011) (per curiam). 
 185 See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2012) (Davis, J., con-
curring). 
 186 See, e.g., Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 938. 
 187 Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (per curiam) (citing Jones v. 
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963)). 
 188 See Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. at 937–38 (“[T]he duty to register under 
SORNA is not a consequence—collateral or otherwise—of the District Court’s 
special condition of supervision.”). 
 189 And is likely not in accord with the Supreme Court’s holding in Maleng. 
See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (holding that a habeas petitioner is not “in custody” 
when sentence for a conviction has already expired even though a possibility re-
mains that “the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed 
for any subsequent crimes”). 
 190 Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 512 
(1982). 
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process.191 The first step in the effective rehabilitation of offenders 
is a “realization by the convict that he is justly subject to sanction, 
that he stands in need of rehabilitation.”192 As Justice Harlan noted, 
Both the individual criminal defendant and society 
have an interest in insuring that there will at some 
point be the certainty that comes with an end to liti-
gation, and that attention will ultimately be focused 
not on whether a conviction was free from error but 
rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a 
useful place in the community.193 
Arguably, no such restoration may ever occur if our habeas system 
allowed for perpetual litigation for individuals no longer subject to 
incarceration and subject to restrictions that the Court has already 
deemed remedial.194 
As well as undermining the system’s penological goals, a perva-
sive lack of finality demonstrates a certain “lack of confidence” in 
our legal process in its entirety.195 By permitting “endless redeter-
mination of questions” previously addressed—at multiple levels in 
the judicial system—we emasculate a general respect for the law.196 
An ineffective system is thereby created where justice is perpetually 
lingering slightly out of reach.197 As Professor Bator aptly noted, 
“Somehow, somewhere, we must accept the fact that human institu-
tions are short of infallible; there is reason for a policy which leaves 
well enough alone and which channels our limited resources of 
 
 191 See Bator, supra note 182, at 452 (“Furthermore, we should at least tenta-
tively inquire whether an endless reopening of convictions, with its continuing 
underlying implication that perhaps the defendant can escape from corrective 
sanctions after all, can be consistent with the aim of rehabilitating offenders.”). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 194 See supra Part V.B.1. 
 195 See Bator, supra note 182, at 452. 
 196 John N. Mitchell, U.S. Att’y Gen., Restoring the Finality of Justice, Ad-
dress Before the Alabama Bar Association (June 25, 1971). 
 197 Bator, supra note 182, at 452 (“The idea of just condemnation lies at the 
heart of the criminal law, and we should not lightly create processes which im-
plicitly belie its possibility.”). 
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concern toward more productive ends.”198 And such resources are, 
in fact, limited. 
The federal docket is consistently at its brink. Prisoner petitions 
have inundated the federal court system, and habeas corpus accounts 
for much of the flooding.199 According to one study, there are an 
estimated 752,000 registered sex offenders in the United States.200 
This number continues to rise with each newly entered sex convic-
tion. In light of the federal judiciary’s struggle to keep pace with the 
flood of petitions from prisoners who are currently incarcerated,201 
shall we nevertheless extend habeas custody to hundreds of thou-
sands of registered sex offenders in the system? The Court may well 
answer that in the negative, agreeing “[w]e should not encourage the 
flow of petitions by expanding the jurisdiction unless there is a felt 
need for such expansion.”202 Such a lack of finality would “seriously 
distort the very limited resources society has allocated to the crimi-
nal process.”203 
 
 198 Id. at 453. 
 199 See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-
2019 (last updated Mar. 31, 2019). 
 200 How Many in Your State?, supra note 15 (reporting from a study done in 
fall of 2019). 
 201 Cf. Andrew Figueroa, The Standards of Noia, Wainwright, and AEDPA—
An Analysis of the Different Standards and a Proposal of a Possible Alternative, 
42 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 385, 400 (2019) (“The leading criticisms against per-
missive habeas is the notion that federal courts are overwhelmingly inundated 
with frivolous habeas petitions and the need to conserve state and federal judicial 
resources.”); David Owens, Connecticut Courts Overwhelmed with Inmates’ Pe-
titions for Release, HARTFORD COURANT (May 10, 2018, 5:35 PM) 
https://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-habeas-reform-effort-20180502-
story.html. 
 202 Bator, supra note 182, at 507. 
 203 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). As Justice Harlan noted, 
While men languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year, 
awaiting a first trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to 
justify expending substantial quantities of the time and energies 
of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the valid-
ity under present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly 
free from error when made final. 
Id. 
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Proponents of custodial expansion would argue that the Supreme 
Court has consistently affirmed the indispensable precept that “the 
principles of comity and finality . . . ‘must yield to the imperative of 
correcting a fundamentally unjust’” scheme of punishment.204 Yet, 
this argument overlooks the critical notion that sex offender regis-
tries are not a—at least de jure—form of punishment. Further, the 
liberty interests at stake may not raise the specter necessary to “out-
weigh[] federalism and finality concerns.”205 Though sex offender 
registration requirements are undoubtedly severe, worries about fi-
nality are at a low for individuals not actually behind bars. We worry 
more about the potentially incorrect “final” condemnation of a pris-
oner facing a long-term jail sentence than one who has been released 
into the community. Thus, finality interests are strengthened in this 
context. 
CONCLUSION 
There are practical reasons why the Court may refuse to extend 
habeas custody to sex offender registration and notification require-
ments. So too are there reasons why the Court may simply choose 
to ignore the disarray of the lower courts. Should the Court take the 
issue under consideration, however, it would be remiss to perpetuate 
the legal fiction advanced by Williamson and its proponents that 
these registration requirements do not amount to severe “restraints 
o[f] . . . liberty” not imposed on the public generally.206 To do so 
would not only undermine the Court’s own precedent but would 
more importantly undermine its credibility as the ultimate arbiter of 
individual liberties. 
 
 204 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320–21 (1995) (citing Murray v. Carrier 477 
U.S. 478, 495 (1986)). 
 205 Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 516 
(1982). 
 206 See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998). 
